

18 March 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: DCI Views on "Perspectives for Intelligence Planning"

25X1 1. These notes are based on a 16 March conference Mr. Colby held with
 25X1 [] and [] re the draft "Perspectives for Intelligence
 Planning," for which [] prepared Part I, "Trends in the World
 Situation," and I wrote Part II, "The Intelligence Imperatives," with
 25X1 sizeable inputs from []

2. Mr. Colby considered the outline and length of the paper were about right, but he wanted the thrust of Part II made directive in nature. He wants the paper overall to be less of an essay with more emphasis on specific actions which must be taken to enable the Intelligence Community to cope with future problems. He suggested a detailed outline be prepared as a basis for discussion, and that brainstorming sessions then be held with the NIOs for Part I and with CIA Deputy Directors and other selected individuals for Part II. Mr. Colby saw no particular need for the draft Part III, "Management."

3. The DCI's comments on Part I emphasized the following:

a. The discussion of trends in the world situation seemed to talk across rather than in accord with the judgments in recent NIEs. In particular, he felt the comments on Sino-Soviet relations did not reflect NIE judgments.

b. The Soviet section focused on various aspects of the threat and should give more consideration to subtle implications of the detente-threat interrelationships and the vulnerabilities of the Brezhnev leadership.

c. The section on "Third World Turbulence" properly focuses on the future, but other sections put too much emphasis on past and present developments.

d. Part I should indicate as specifically as possible what developments in the world environment during the next several years are going to require new or improved intelligence capabilities. Identification of these in Part I will enable the discussion of "intelligence imperatives" to be written in directive format specifically identifying the actions which the Intelligence Community must take.

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4. Mr. Colby's remarks concerning Part II were generally as follows:

a. Part II should provide clear, succinct guidance based on the trends outlined in Part I. With respect to the USSR and the PRC, for instance, he wants the paper to say that "It is clear we are going to have to..." and then get very specific.

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b. Mr. Colby considers the paper should stimulate examination of the particular items or equipment or the particular sensors which are going to be needed, and then provide specific guidance as to what needs to be done about acquiring them and putting them to use. This examination should provide basis for decisions as to whether he and other responsible officials should support or reject initiative proposals for new collection vehicles or sensors. He suggested the R&D Council might be tasked to develop views as to what the community must be prepared to do in the future. As an example of the type of problem which could be addressed, he cited the Soviet cruise missile threat. What must we know about the command and control of these missiles to enable the development of U.S. countermeasures--and how do we go about assuring that we possess or acquire capabilities to collect what we need to know?

c. He wants attention given to the problem of identifying what kinds of intelligence analysis will be particularly important five years from now and how this is going to impact on the production process. Two questions he asked were: What actions must be taken to develop new analytical methodologies? Are we going to need new types of experts, such as sociologists?

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e. With respect to reconnaissance, he drew a distinction between wartime and peacetime purposes. For wartime purposes, R&D and initial investment is needed to provide a base for meeting wartime intelligence needs when peacetime operating restrictions are not applicable. For peacetime operations, Mr. Colby stressed that emphasis must be put on the development of secret or untraceable capabilities.

f. The paper should include consideration of the relationship between secrecy requirements as contrasted with the need to make intelligence more publicly responsive. He noted that this is a continuing dilemma in the United States, but the Intelligence Community must face up to the requirement that it be more open than counterpart organizations elsewhere in the world. He considers that American citizens need to be generally aware of what intelligence organizations are doing if the Community is to continue to receive necessary support -- support which is expressed in Congressional action on the budget. Mr. Colby particularly stressed the need to devote attention to techniques and mechanisms by which U.S. business can benefit from access to U.S. intelligence--noting that such relationships already have been worked out in other major countries. Business leaders need to be more aware of how the Community conducts itself.

5. In support of his decision to eliminate Part III, Mr. Colby explained he saw management as a matter of what needs to be done from year to year. He saw no need to discuss possible structural changes in the Community, even though changes may take place as circumstances warrant. He noted that a new DCI or a new President might have different ideas as to organization of the Community than those now current, so structure was not really pertinent to a paper which is looking at the longer term problems.

6. He indicated, however, that the comments in Part III re the need for collaboration in training and for development of new skills should be kept in the paper. He also wanted attention given to trends in manpower skills mix, and to how changes in the international situation could affect overseas allocations of intelligence manpower.

7. In essence, Mr. Colby wants to use the "Perspectives" paper as a means of taking responsibility for anticipating future needs and developing necessary responses away from technicians and raising it to policy levels of the Community. He cited that if technicians come forward with proposals for a new U-2, a [redacted] type vehicle, or some other technical system, policy levels must be in a position to know whether such proposals should be encouraged or denied.

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8. Upon completion of a draft which he considers suitable--which will be based on the results of brainstorming with the IC Staff, the



NIOS and selected CIA officials--Mr. Colby then would like to brainstorm it with the Program Managers and members of the USIB and IRAC. He recognizes that it will be desirable to have a completed paper before the end of May if it is to be useful in the development of the FY 1976 budget, and he hoped the kind of discussions which he felt were necessary would not unduly delay completion of the document.



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